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ABSTRACT
The change in trading volume and returns and the dysfunction 
of the economy and more specifically of financial markets has been 
increasingly attracting attention of researchers, analysts, practitioners, 
institutions as well as government organizations. This paper investigates 
the factors that are able to explain how financial markets work. Testing 
the rational expectation hypothesis and different components of animal 
spirits including investors’ beliefs and their behavioral biases, results 
show that economy is driven by animal spirits and not by rational 
behavior. Considering the classification of the sample by periods of 
stability and periods of excessive volatility, results incite to think that 
financial markets work in terms of economic cycles.
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Introduction
Financial markets have witnessed an excessive change in trading volume and returns 
which causes abnormal losses and tremendous financial recessions and scandals af-
fecting the financial and economic world during about the last thirty years (July 
1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001 and the recession that began in 
December 2007 in the case of the U.S., the recession of the 1990s for the Japan, In-
donesia after 1998, Argentina after 2001, European Union during 2000 and 2001, 
East Asia during 1997,…). In the real economic world, these recessions and scandals 
have not been known only in recent decades, they have been observed since more 
than one hundred years. The best known are, however, as an indication and not 
limitation, those of the crash of October 1929 and the oil crisis of 1973.
Although the importance of investigations they made, economists have failed to 
understand how the economy really works (Posner, 2009). In this sense, different 
explanations are theoretically considered to explain the excessive crises and scandals 
affecting largely the financial and economic spheres, especially, spanning about the 
last five decades. In financial markets, the authors analyze the efficiency of markets 
and the rationality of investors and attribute the dysfunction of financial markets to 
informational bias. However, in spite of the importance of its implications the ratio-
nal expectation hypothesis, largely based on the efficient market hypothesis, fails to 
explain the excessive change in trading and returns in the major financial markets in 
developed and emerging countries (see, Lavoie,  2010). Numerous other authors at-
tribute the excessive change in returns and trading volume in the major internation-
al markets to behavioral biases and investors’ belief such as overconfidence (Dan-
iel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998), optimism (Haruvy, Stahl and Wilson, 
1999; Weinstein, 1989; Otten, 1989) or pessimism (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987; 
Barberis Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). More recently, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) come 
back to reconsider the Keynesian General Theory recommendation and introduce 
what they call, such as used for the first time by Keynes (1936), the “animal spirits” 
in order to explain how the economy really works.
However, in spite of the importance of prior investigations, the causes of financial 
and economic crises and recessions remain disputable and the results remain non-
conclusive. This leads to investigate the dysfunction of financial markets introduc-
ing variables other than that referred to the rational expectation considering, among 
others, investors’ beliefs and behaviors. The aim of this paper is, consequently, to 
examine the causes of crises and scandals in the financial and economic world and 
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to understand how the economy really works. In order to do, we investigate together 
the hypothesis of rational expectation as well as the behavioral biases. These latter 
are expressed in terms of animal spirits including optimism, pessimism, overconfi-
dence and spontaneous reaction. This investigation gives answers to our main ques-
tion, which is the following: 
What are the factors influencing the way how  financial and economic spheres 
work? 
Considering the trading volume and the stock market index as a financial proxy for 
the economy work, results, using data for 12 International Capital Markets over 
the period spanning August 2002 to mid-November 2011, remain non conclusive. 
Classification of the analysis by periods of stability and periods of excessive volatility 
indicates same impacts of explanatory variables on the trading volume for different 
periods and for about all markets. However, in the global vision, economy is largely 
driven by animal spirits. The rational expectation hypothesis loses of significance 
and fails to explain how the economy works.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a theoretical 
overview of the factors which are likely able to explain how the economy works. Sec-
tion 3 describes the methodology and the data framework of this study and specifies 
the model to estimate. In section 4, we present and discuss the main results. Section 
5 is spared to the conclusion.
Literature Review
Economists consider that economic and financial recessions and crises are mainly 
caused by factors excluding changing in thought patterns. They attribute the dys-
function of economies and more specifically of financial markets to the failure of 
investors to expect rationally the future incomes and the evolution of stock returns. 
Beliefs and sentiments are largely excluded from theoretical and empirical models. 
Behavioral finance, however, introduces the beliefs and sentiments such as opti-
mism, pessimism, overconfidence… to explain the excessive volatility in prices and 
trading volumes. Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p. 4) argue in the specific framework of 
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behavior explanation that “the current crisis bears witness to the role of such changes in 
thinking. It was caused precisely by our changing confidence, temptations, envy, resent-
ment, and illusions”. These thinking components compose according to Akerlof and 
Shiller what they call the “Animal Spirits”. In this specific framework, they consider 
that Human psychology drives the economy and matters for global capitalism. This 
behavior argument (i.e. animal spirits) has appeared since about more than seventy 
years ago when Keyens (1936) has noted, in his Genaral Theory, that about most of 
what we do in our life and especially in economic life are mainly due to behavioral 
biases such as animal spirits and not as a simple result of rational reaction toward 
acts and events. In this specific area, he argues that “most, probably, of our decisions to 
do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days 
to come, can only be taken as the results of animal spirits […] and not at the outcome 
of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities” 
(Keynes, 1932, p. 168). This point of view is supported more recently by Akerlof 
and Shiller (2009, p. 168) who insist on an explicit manner on the importance of 
the behavioral components of which the animal spirits in the economic life. They ar-
gue, “It is necessary to incorporate animal spirits into macroeconomic theory in order to 
know how the economy really works. In this respect the macroeconomics of the past thirty 
years has gone in the wrong direction. In their attempts to clean up macroeconomics and 
make it more scientific, the standard macroeconomists have imposed research structure 
and discipline by focusing on how the economy would behave if people had only economic 
motives and if they were also fully rational.”. Here, the authors challenge in an explicit 
manner the rational expectation hypothesis. We note, accordingly, that the authors 
insist on the incorporation of psychological components to explain the evolution of 
markets and economies. Thus, a non surprising sentence shown on the cover page 
of their book is “How Human Psychology Drives the Economy and Why it Matters for 
Global Capitalism”. This incites to new thinking in the framework of the evolution 
of the financial economic world.
Considering both the definition given by Keynes (1936) and that of Akerlof and 
Shiller (2009) to the concept of “animal spirits”, we can investigate the impact of sev-
eral psychological factors on the evolution of the two components of financial markets 
namely stock prices and trading volume. However, before these investigations, we try 
to define the concept of “animal spirits” according to these authors. Keynes (1936, 
p.161) defines the “animal spirits” as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inac-
tion”. From this definition, Keynes excludes all rational components from investors’ 
behavior. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) continue in the same line of idea and enlarge this 
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definition to insert other behavioral components such as Antisocial behavior or Social 
limits of profits, Monetary illusion, Changes in economic equity, Fairness, Legends 
instead facts and figures, Corruption, History, Exuberance and overconfidence (see 
Akelrlof and Shiller (2009, p. 5-6) and Guldberg (2010) for more details). In this 
framework, Keynes (1936) as well as Akerlof and Shiller (2009) challenge the rational 
expectation hypothesis and incite to introduce human psychology as the crucial factor 
driving investors’ decisions and, therefore, markets and economies.
Keynes challenges, especially, the rational expectation hypothesis since it is based on 
a quantitative model neglecting human aspects. He considers, however, that Hu-
man aspects matter more than rational expectation in making decision. In this line, 
he argues explicitly that about the majority of our decisions depends only on these 
behavioral components. 
Several empirical studies have confirmed the behavior based explanations of the 
economy works in the major international markets in developed and emerging coun-
tries. In a recent work, Dhaoui, Farhani and Garfatta. (2012) attribute the changes 
in trading volume in the Japanese market to the aggressive reaction of overconfident 
investors. Dhaoui (2011) introduce several behavioral components to explain the 
economy works in the case of five developed countries: Japan, U.S., Switzerland, 
U.K. and France. He developed an empirical model in order to investigate the im-
pact of rational expectation as well as investors’ beliefs such as Overconfidence, 
Pessimism, Optimism and Sponateous reaction on trading volume. The results of 
the study show that the rational expectation hypothesis fails to explain the evolu-
tion of the trading volume as one of the financial components of a stock market. 
The impact of the behavioral factors varies, however, from one market to the other 
depending on the specificity and the characteristics of the population. The changes 
of the trading volume in the context of the Japanese is explained by the aggressive 
reaction of more overconfident investors. Oppositely, the change of trading in the 
French  Market is due, especially, to the excessive pessimism in the investors’ beliefs. 
The excessive change in trading in the U.S., the Swiss and the U.K. markets are due, 
however, to more than one psychological factor. The reactions of optimistic, pessi-
mistic or overconfident investors as well as that of those with spontaneous reaction 
drive these markets and influence largely the evolution of trading.
The investors’ beliefs as components of animal spirits are also considered in several 
other studies (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Haruvy, Stahl and 
Wilson, 1999; Weinstein, 1989; Otten, 1989; De Bondt and Thaler, 1987; Barberis 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Ciccone, 2003; Piroscă, 2011). A point of view com-
monly shared by the major of authors is that investors’ beliefs impact significantly 
the economy works and explain in a major part the economy dysfunction.
Taken together, these empirical and theoretical arguments give explanations to the 
financial distress. The financial recessions can be interpreted as a consequence of an 
interruption of normal functioning of markets. In these lines, Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009, p. 6) argue theoretically that “financial stress can be thought of as an interruption 
to the normal functioning of financial markets”. The interruption in markets function-
ing implies the reject of the hypotheses according to which financial markets react 
following fundamental prediction. Anomalies and behavioral biases play therefore 
a pivotal role in the decision-making process. The investors’ beliefs are, hence, the 
most important factors driving the economy works. In this sense, Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009, p. 6) consider that “one common sign of financial stress is increased uncertainty 
among lenders and investors about the fundamental values of financial assets”. This uncer-
tainty can be explained as a consequence of the non-rational reaction of investors. The 
behavioral based reaction induces a distorted prevision of the price evolution given the 
uncertainty in investors’ beliefs and sentiments. This influences significantly the evolu-
tion of the two components of financial markets namely returns and trading volumes. 
Accordingly, the abnormal changes in trading volumes and the low returns largely ob-
served in the major international markets can be explained among others by the reac-
tion of non-rational investors. In this same vein, Dhaoui (2011) among others found 
that the rational expectation hypothesis loses of significance in the major international 
markets and that economies are driven by behavioral biases such Overconfidence and 
Optimism for the specific case of the Japanese Stock Market, Pessimism and “Sponta-
neous urge to action rather than inaction” for the case of French Stock Exchange and 
all factors comprising the “Animal Spirits” behavioral bias, including Overconfidence, 
Spontaneous Reaction, Opromism and Pessimism,  for the cases of the U.S. the U.K. 
and the Swiss Stock Markets.
Data and Methodology
This section presents a description of the sample and the period of analysis. It il-
lustrates also the measurement of each dependent and independent variable that is 
used and specifies the model to estimate. 
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Sample Period and Stock Markets Investigated
The sample covers the period spanning  from 01 August 2002 to 17 November 
2011. The analyses include different markets that have been affected by at least one 
crisis during this period. We include here different stock markets in order to inves-
tigate the impact of investors’ behavior during the periods of stability and those of 
excessive volatility on trading volume. The stock markets investigated are those of 
U.S (Nasdaq), Japan (Nikkei225), U.K. (FTSE100), France (CAC40), Switzerland 
(SSMI), Malaysia (MLSE), New Zealand (NZSE), Seoul (KS11), Shanghai (SCE 
composite), Hong Kong (HIS), Bombay (BSE) and Australia (All ordinaries). Data 
is available online on the yahoo Finance pages and on the website of each Stock 
Market.
Proxy for Used Variables
The investors’ beliefs change following the evolution of gains and losses across the 
unit of time. Ciccone (2003) uses annual earnings forecast to determine optimism. 
Optimism is present when the mean annual earnings forecast exceeds the corre-
sponding actual earnings. By extension, pessimism is present when the mean annual 
earnings forecast is lower than the corresponding actual earnings. In our case, we 
consider than optimism (respectively pessimism) is present when returns exceed (de-
crease under) a target level. Accordingly, investors act in optimistic way when they 
realize gains that exceed a desired level. Let ( )( )RR  the level starting from which 
the investor can be considered optimistic, with R the average return and ( )R  the 
standard deviation of returns. In this sense, the investor is considered optimistic 
when he realized returns higher than ( )( )RR  at the time (t-1). the investors act 
as optimistic when prior returns are higher than this level and in the normal way 
if not. Accordingly, the indicator of optimistic sentiments of the investor takes the 
value ( 1)tR   when ( 1) ( )( )t RR R    and 0 otherwise. This measure was used in 
Dhaoui (2011).
Oppositely, pessimistic belief occurs when losses decrease below the level ( )( )RR  . 
Considering the same structure, investors are pessimistic when ( 1) ( )( )t RR R    and 
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then the indicator of pessimism takes the value ( 1)tR  , and takes the value 0 if not. This 
measure was used in Dhaoui (2011).
When returns are included in the interval ( ) ( )( ) , ( )R RR R      investors react 
in a spontaneous manner. The spontaneous reaction variable takes, thus, the value 
( 1)tR   when ( 1) ( ) ( )( ) , ( )t R RR R R        and 0 otherwise.
Overconfidence occurs when an investor realizes gains in previous date. Overconfi-
dence is more pronounced once investor realizes at the time “t” a gain higher than 
that in time (t-1). Considering investor who will make a decision at the time “t”, he 
reacts in overconfidence manner if his gains in (t-1) exceed his gains in time (t-2). 
Oppositely when gains at time (t-1) decrease below their level in (t-2) the investor 
loses of confidence. The variable overconfidence will be investigated considering the 
impact of  observed return at the time (t-1) (i.e. ( 1)tR  ) on the trading volume at 
the time “t” (i.e. tV ). This measure was used in Boynton, Oppenheimer and Reid 
(2009), Ulussever, Guranyumusak and Kar (2011) and Dhaoui et al. (2012).
Rational expectation supposes that investors anticipate future evolution of returns 
considering the realized return at the current time and adjust their anticipations 
by the error of anticipation of the returns for the current time. Considering the 
time interval  ( 1) ,t t , the rational expectation for the time “t” follows this rela-
tion : ( 1) ( 1)
Exp
t t tR R E   , with ExptR  represents the expected return at the time 
“t”, and ( 1)tE   represents the error of expectation at the time (t-1) that is equal 
to the difference between realized return and expected return at the time (t-1) : 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
Exp
t t tE R R    .
The Model
To investigate the contribution of investors’ beliefs and behaviors to the explanation 
of the evolution of trading volume across the time we develop the following model:
1 2 3 4 5Re (1)t t t t t t tV RatExp OverConf Spont act Optimism Pessimism            
With tV  represents the natural logarithm of trading volume and t  is an error term.
Results of estimation will take into account the periods of excessive volatility of 
returns and that of stability. Excessive volatility gives an idea on the dysfunction of 
financial markets or more specifically financial crises and recessions.
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Results and Discussions
To investigate the causes of financial recessions we investigate the effect of the in-
vestors’ beliefs on the variability of trading volume in periods of stability and in 
periods of high volatility of returns. The periods of high volatility are determined 
approximately following dates of crashes and recessions indicated by international 
financial and economic organizations (World Bank, IMF, WTO…) and the clas-
sification relies on the results of graphical analyses. Hereafter we present graphs of 
the evolution of returns spanning the whole period from August 2002 to November 
2011 by stock market.
Graph 1. 1st panel : Countries with one single period of Volatility
Figure 1: Mlaysia (KLSE), 2287 obs. Figure 2: Japan (Nikkei225), 2328 obs.
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Figure 3: New Zealand (NZSE50), 1757 obs. Figure 4: Shanghai (SSE Composite Index), 
1493 obs.
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Figure 5: Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), 2072 obs.
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Graph 2. 2nd panel : Countries with two periods of Volatility
Figure 6. Hong Kong (HIS), 2281 obs. Figure 7. Australian Securities Exchanges 
(AORD All Ordinaries), 2214 obs.
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Figure 8. France (CAC40), 2310 obs.
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Graph 3. 3rd panel : Countries with three periods of Volatility
Figure 9. Switzerland (Swiss Market SSMI), 
2255 obs.
Figure 10. U.K. (FTSE 100), 2263 obs.
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Figure 11. U.S. (Nasdaq 100), 2318 obs. Figure 12. Seoul Composite (KS11), 2318 
obs.
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Graphical analyses give an idea about the classification of the countries by periods 
of stability and of the high volatility of their markets. Table 1 summarizes this clas-
sification by periods of stability and high volatility.
                  
Table 1. Classification of stable vs volatile period by stock markets
Markets
August 2002 
to March 
2003
April 
2003 
to Jun 
2007
July 2007 to 
September 
2009
October 
2009 to 
July 2011
After August 
2011
1st Panel
Japan Stability Volatility Stability
Bombay Stock Exchange Stability Volatility Stability
New Zealand Stability Volatility Stability
Shanghai Stability Volatility Stability
Malaysia Stability Volatility Stability
2nd Panel
Hong Kong Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
France Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
Australian Securities 
Exchange Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
3rd Panel
Switzerland Volatility Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
U.K. Volatility Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
U.S. Volatility Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
Seoul Composite Volatility Stability Volatility Stability Volatility
According to table 1, we can classify the countries composing our sample in three 
panels. The first contains the Japan, Bombay, Shanghai, New Zealand and Malaysia. 
These countries have known a high volatility in their markets starting July 2007 to 
September 2009. 
The second panel includes three countries having two volatile periods namely Hong 
Kong, France and Australia. The first volatile period starts in July 2007 and finishes 
in September 2009. The second period of volatility starts in August 2011. And, 
finally, the last panel contains four countries namely Switzerland, U.K., U.S. and 
Seoul. These countries have known three periods of volatility. The first starts in 
August 2002 and finishes in March 2003. The second period of volatility plains for 
all the period between July 2007 and September 2009. The third period starts in 
August 2011. For all panels, starting and final dates are determined approximately 
using results in the graphics above.
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Considering these characteristics of international Markets we adopt the same classi-
fication and analyze the evolution of investors’ behavior across the periods of stabil-
ity and those of high volatility. This allows to determine the factors influencing the 
investors’ reaction.
Tables 2 to 6 present results for the first panel including markets with a single vola-
tile period covering July 2007 to September 2009.
Table 2. Results for Malaysian Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 17/011/2011
(Stability)
M
al
ay
si
a
Rational 
expectation
-0,0018671
(-0,02)
0,029306
(0,22)
-0,000863
(-0,06)
Optimism 3,952122 ***(10,12)
2,457814 ***
(5,21)
2,027082 ***
(4,02)
Pessimism -2,966418 ***(-8,85)
-2,085144 ***
(-4,20)
-2,630279 ***
(-6,38)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
1,772425 ***
(4,39) 
1,639592 **
(2,02)
6,02156 *
(1,73)
Overconfidence 5,415741 ***(2,56)
5,529746 *
(1,86)
-0,900518
(-0,66)
Cons_ 18,21633 ***(16,15)
19,02779 ***
(10,34)
18,4898 ***
(12,92)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,1163
0,1133
1456
0,1356
0,1214
309
0,1994
0,1918
532
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Table 3. Results for Japanese Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 17/011/2011
(Stability)
Ja
pa
n
Rational 
expectation
-0,0146175
(-0,18)
-0,00048082
(-0,61)
0,0017469
(0,16)
Optimism 5,496744(4,19)***
3,987197
(5,96)***
6,365698
(4,64)***
Pessimism -6,383355(-5,41)***
-3,651358
(-6,36)***
-4,947251
(-3,80)***
Spontaneous 
Reaction
-3,443485 ***
(-2,75)
1,487952
(1,11)
0,5675622
(0,43)
Overconfidence 1,781031 ***(-2,56)
-0,18953
(-0,49)
0,4319584
(0,59)
Cons_ 12,52128(13,15)***
11,80451
(11,29)***
11,80701
(11,17)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,2457
0,2427
1245
0,1119
0,1038
549
0,1602
0,1519
514
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Table 4. Results for New Ealand Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 17/011/2011
(Stability)
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
Rational 
expectation
-0,0648184
(-0,706)
0,0371711
(0,74)
0,0073104
(0,22)
Optimism 9,17813 **(2,02)
10,88856 ***
(4,35)
9,682107 ***
(4,69)
Pessimism -12,42906 ***(-2,68)
-3,853524 *
(-1,71)
-5,591399 ***
(-3,00)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
0,3652308
(0,08)
1,419302
(0,29)
0,5953874
(0,22)
Overconfidence -0,3954135(-0,15)
-1,033097
(-0,72)
-1,184377
(-1,01)
Cons_ 17,06697(10,31)
17,17036
(9,21)
17,15519 ***
(16,78)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,2164
0,2103
652
0,3571
0,3514
566
0,1677
0,1653
1757
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Table 5. Results for Shanghai Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 17/011/2011
(Stability)
Sh
an
gh
ai
Rational 
expectation
0,1174147
(0,079)
0,0000294
(0,02)
0,0000666
(0,96)
Optimism 10,9254 ***(5,19)
0,3974354 ***
(2,70)
0,0021573
(0,24)
Pessimism -6,389313 ***(-3,6)
-0,1794908
(-1,38)
-0,0021634
(-0,33)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
7,528852 ***
(2,87)
0,5108541 **
(2,02)
0,0055034
(0,81)
Overconfidence -1,677286(-0,83)
0,3199599 ***
(3,88)
0,0007502
(0,18)
Cons_ 21,8397 ***(70,35)
22,1649
(89,75)
22,18064
(3,8)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,4959
0,4898
416
0,4359
0,4307
549
0,3618
0,3556
523
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Table 6. Results for Bombay Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 17/011/2011
(Stability)
Bo
m
ba
y
Rational 
expectation
0,0001376
(0,01)
-0,0232592
(-0,51)
0,0063136
(0,32)
Optimism 5,975804(2,60)***
2,754436
(1,96)**
10,53096
(5,59)***
Pessimism -6,315796(-2,78)***
-7,391564
(-5,12)***
-11,76311
(-6,89)***
Spontaneous 
Reaction
1,315978
(0,73)
-1,754886
(-0,56)
-1,575617
(-0,91)
Overconfidence -0,2895931(-0,024)
0,221533
(0,26)
0,1298517
(0,14)
Cons_ 9,65496 ***(65,42)
10,12245 ***
(37,98)
9,843536 ***
(66,67)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,2642
0,2573
538
0,4983
0,4937
550
0,7266
0,7252
983
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Animal Spirits and Trading Volume in International Financial Markets between 2002 and 2011
177Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
Results in tables 2 to 6 indicate that the hypothesis of rational expectation loses of 
significance to explain the variability of trading volume in both: periods of stability 
and the period of high volatility in the five stock markets composing this sub-sam-
ple. Oppositely, the animal spirits behavior of investors explains about the whole 
the variability of trading volume in the same way in periods of stability and in the 
period of excessive volatile trading in the case of Malaysian, Bombay and Japanese 
Markets. In fact, the reaction of the optimistic investors influences positively the 
trading volume. Oppositely, the reaction of the pessimistic investors impacts nega-
tively the trading volume. 
Except the case of the Market of Shanghai, for all the other markets (Japan, Malay-
sia, Bombay and New Zealand) all the components of animal spirits variable impact 
in about a similar way the trading volume even in periods of stability or in that of 
high volatility. Thus, in the case of these stock markets we cannot attribute the high 
variability of trading volume in the period of non-stability to the decisions made by 
investors with the animal spirits reaction.
Tables 7 to 9 give results for countries having known two periods of high volatility. 
The first takes place spanning from July 2007 to September 2009 and the second 
starts in August 2011. 
Table 7. Results for Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002 
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007 
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009 
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011 
to 17/011/2011
(High volatility)
H
on
g 
Ko
ng
Rational 
expectation
0,0094716
(0,38)
-0,0086295
(-0,32)
-0,110444
(-1,27)
0,0569733
(0,48)
Optimism 9,727746(2,76)***
8,921321
(11,49)***
9,428507
(3,79)***
7,884296
(2,62)***
Pessimism -1,411207(-3,96)***
-8,101631
(-10,51)***
-13,29175
(-6,22)***
-6,516842
(-2,52)***
Spontaneous 
Reaction
7,963819
(3,07)***
4,095233
(2,07)**
0,6893569
(0,37)
-0,3024628
(-0,06)
Overconfidence 4,144081(2,33)**
1,599998
(3,38)***
-0,4723748
(-0,40)
0,529921
(0,31)
Cons_ 19,67071(10,57)***
21,42976
(13,60)***
21,10563
(14,04)***
21,36374
(43,87)***
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,2956
0,2926
1192
0,2573
0,2505
555
0,1101
0,1000
447
0,1165
0,0613
86
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Table 8. Results for Australian Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002 
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007 
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009 
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011 
to 17/011/2011
(High volatility)
A
us
tr
al
ia
Rational 
expectation
-0,0733917**
(-1,98)
-0,0141237
(-0,41)
-0,008164
(-0,53)
0,0058698
(0,18)
Optimism 12,60348***(3,52)
3,956039*
(1,90)
7,341521***
(2,66)
3,530575
(1,05)
Pessimism -12,88308***(-4,03)
-1,486838
(-0,82)
-10,31233***
(-4,24)
-4,137054
(-1,30)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
1,081162
(0,47)
4,417508
(1,04)
1,79318
(0,64)
1,420481**
(2,00)
Overconfidence -1,995823(-1,21)
-0,6302036
(-0,54)
-1,346957
(-0,92)
-1,872936
(-0,98)
Cons_ 20,17996***(18,17)
20,6959***
(84,77)
20,89099
(13,52)
20,83000***
(50,92)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,3181
0,315
1094
0,3295
0,3236
572
0,5447
0,2396
456
0,6179
0,5949
89
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Table 9. Results for French Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002 
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007 
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009 
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011 
to 17/011/2011
(High volatility)
Fr
an
ce
Rational 
expectation
0,0021435
(0,02)
0,0009854
(0,09)
-0,0084168
(-0,83)
-0,0144636
(-0,378)
Optimism 1,382417***(3,78)
7,443982***
(7,27)
6,406972***
(2,75)
5,60802***
(2,49)
Pessimism -2,007958***(-6,00)
-8,564161***
(-8,79)
-13,11779
(-6,52)
-7,076897***
(-3,64)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
-1,344369
(-0,66)
-0,6155619
(-0,31)
-1,952723
(-0,86)
-6,716509
(-1,32)
Overconfidence -1,794604(-1,14)
-0,7888018
(-1,26)
-2,153704*
(-1,83)
-3,137049***
(-2,56)
Cons_ 18,43785***(13,92)
18,77479***
(12,72)
18,64237***
(10,73)
18,93855***
(44,66)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,4708
0,467
698
0,1748
0,1675
574
0,1058
0,0961
468
0,2636
0,2132
79
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Results in tables 7 to 9 indicate for the three countries (France, Hong Kong and 
Australia) that optimism and pessimism hypotheses as components of animal spirits 
bias explain the economy works in both: periods of stability and periods of high 
volatility. For the specific case of Hong Kong, results show also that the reactions of 
overconfident investors and those with spontaneous reaction impact in their turn 
the economy works. The hypothesis of rational expectation remain non-significant 
for the three countries even the period is of stability or of high volatility.
Results for countries with three volatile periods are given in tables 10 to 13. 
Table 10. Results for Swiss Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 31/03/2003
(High volatility)
01/04/2003
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011
to 17/11/2011
(High volatility)
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Rational 
expectation
-0,1111289
(-0,55)
-0,0126377
(-0,51)
0,0073701
(0,71)
0,0127327
(1,56)
-0,0034019
(-0,19)
Optimism 8,386031***(2,44)
6,39788**
(2,25)
8,499868***
(6,87)
6,928711**
(2,09)
9,748404***
(2,91)
Pessimism -1,886762(-0,59)
-6,534211***
(-6,04)
-9,597526***
(-8,05)
-8,147291***
(-6,57)
-11,218586***
(-3,76)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
4,607594
(0,61)
0,7302884
(0,34)
-3,699637
(-1,42)
-1,872912
(-0,72)
2,218586
(0,31)
Overconfidence 1,456902(0,67)
-1,798946
-1,26
-1,260576*
(-1,67)
-3,097999*
(-1,90)
-4,712409***
(-2,48)
Cons_ 17,69276(35,37)
17,80328***
(14,19)
18,17439***
(11,68)
17,77902***
(11,37)
17,8621***
(38,28)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,1164
0,0559
79
0,3831
0,3802
1071
0,1629
0,1554
564
0,1134
0,1037
463
0,2936
0,2446
78
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Table 11. Results for UK Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 31/03/2003
(High volatility)
01/04/2003
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011
to 17/11/2011
(High volatility)
U
K
Rational 
expectation
0,0019037
(0,02)
0,0065213
(0,39)
-0,0014575
(-0,07)
0,0027181
(0,12)
-0,138409
(-0,14)
Optimism 2,977028
(0,59)
3,993008*
(1,69)
3,729751***
(3,15)
6,913669***
(2,62)
6,150827***
(2,34)
Pessimism -4,354747
(-0,84)
-8,801088***
(-3,89)
-5,386519***
(-4,85)
-4,992221***
(-5,84)
-8,58405***
(-3,60)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
-11,50274
(-1,09)
-1,253282
(-0,85)
-2,563612
(-1,06)
-2,953955
(-1,08)
4,72253
(0,88)
Overconfidence -3,349596
(-1,02)
-1,881756*
(-1,73)
-1,403448**
(-1,96)
-4,08298***
(-2,76)
-3,493217***
(-2,42)
Cons_ 21,07296
(30,97)
21,17952***
(25,71)
20,94948***
(13,09)
20,59363***
(12,03)
20,57805**
(56,537)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,4505
0,4143
82
0,196
0,1922
1073
0,361
0,3553
570
0,1016
0,0917
460
0,2585
0,207
78
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Table 12. Results for US Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 31/03/2003
(High volatility)
01/04/2003
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011
to 17/11/2011
(High volatility)
U
S
Rational 
expectation
-0,0013339
(-0,05)
0,0060562
(0,34)
0,0027018
(0,19)
-0,0149435
(-0,30)
0,023649
(0,91)
Optimism 4,77477***(4,30)
2,655937**
(1,96)
2,548728***
(3,82)
1,6657
(0,67)
4,279347***
(2,29)
Pessimism -1,711587(-1,31)
-3,733872***
(-2,6)
-2,644234***
(-4,23)
-8,066696***
(-3,72)
-7,355007***
(-4,85)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
9,967913***
(3,62)
-1,079388
(-0,90)
-0,2475651
(-0,18)
-5,27086**
(-2,25)
2,132501
(0,65)
Overconfidence 0,4343431(0,61)
-0,4189386
(-0,56)
-0,9743913***
(-2,42)
-3,109979***
(-2,38)
-2,874493***
(-2,93)
Cons_ 21,06314(97,67)
21,28201***
(23,93)
21,46282***
(21,67)
21,44617***
(13,21)
21,38062***
(76,58)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,1862
0,1561
141
0,2117
0,2078
1027
0, 4599
0,4554
611
0,3575
0,3504
461
0,3421
0,2965
78
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
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Table 13. Results for Seoul Stock Exchange
Countries Variables
01/08/2002
to 31/03/2003
(High volatility)
01/04/2003
to 30/06/2007
(Stability)
01/07/2007
to 30/09/2009
(High volatility)
01/10/2009
to 31/07/2011
(Stability)
01/08/2011
to 17/11/2011
(High volatility)
Se
ou
l
Rational 
expectation
-0,0500564
(-0,35)
0,006156
(0,50)
-0,0014951
(-0,12)
0,0019769
(0,34)
0,000056
(0,09)
Optimism 6,323745***(2,55)
5,3764027***
(2,78)
4,455644***
(2,51)
0,2132635
(0,10)
0,1409836
(0,09)
Pessimism 3,448822(1,54)
-2,934043
(-1,51)
-0,0555116
(-0,04)
-2,642974*
(-1,66)
-2,506756*
(-1,80)
Spontaneous 
Reaction
-2,143304
(-0,52)
3,009507
(1,36)
2,603327
(0,82)
-0,3265051
(-0,24)
-0,9799284
(-0,31)
Overconfidence 3,455121***(2,40)
2,152928*
(1,88)
2,143484**
(2,11)
0,348115
(0,38)
-0,6763232
(-0,76)
Cons_ 13,54845***(39,96)
12,80747***
(78,72)
12,90968***
(52,13)
12,75659***
(12,68)
12,82902***
(48,73)
R-Square 
Adj R-Square
N. obs.
0,3976
0,3787
165
0,2213
0,2176
1054
0,1874
0,1801
559
0,1636
0,1542
453
0,1653
0,1125
85
***: Significant at the level 1%,  **: Significant at the level 5%,  *: Significant at the level 10%. 
Results in tables 10 to 13 indicate even for countries having three periods of vola-
tility that the hypothesis of rational expectations loses of significance and fails to 
explain the evolution of trading volume. Sentiments and beliefs drive, however, the 
economy. In fact, optimism affects significantly and positively the trading volumes 
whereas pessimism presents significant and negative influences. The weight of im-
pacts is similar even the period is of stability or characterized by a high volatility.
Taken together results for the whole sample including countries with one single vola-
tile period, those with two periods and those with three volatile periods tend toward 
the same conclusions. The rationality fails to explain how the economy really works; 
sentiments, beliefs and animal spirits drive, however, the economy. These results are 
consistent with the prediction of Keynes (1936) who argues that all decisions to do 
something constitutes most probably a consequence of only animal spirits reaction 
of the decision-makers and not a result of rational thinking based on statics and 
models. The results confirm and spur the prediction of Akerlof and Shiller (2009) 
who plead in favor of the fact that “Human Psychology Drives the Economy”.
Considering these results we cannot conclude moreover that Human Psychology con-
stitutes the only factor which causes definitely the dysfunction of the economy. We 
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can conclude, however, that sentiments, beliefs or animal spirits can be considered 
among the main causes of crises once there is no institutional and governmental 
control. Markets trade ordinary and the accumulation of biases caused by the reac-
tion of non-rational investors induces across the time abnormal losses or abnormal 
gains. Non-rational investors (those with animal spirits reaction) continue their 
trading even when markets are not healthy and this behavior lunches the first signs 
of dysfunction of the financial markets. When institutions and government organi-
zations delay their intervention the impact on the trading can be exacerbated. 
Conclusion
The causes of financial recessions and economy dysfunction has come to the fore-
front of attention of academics, analysts, practitioners, investors, government and 
all who are interested in financial markets and this probably because of the problems 
which have been revealed in the economic sphere.
Non-rational expectation, investor sentiments, behavioral biases, animal spirits are 
all factors considered to explain the dysfunction of the economy once the hypoth-
esis of rationality loses of power to explain the excessive volatility and the abnormal 
gains and losses in the financial markets.
Using a sample of 12 international markets over a period of analysis spanning August 
2002 to the mid-September 2011, results shown that economy works is explained 
in terms of animal spirits and that the hypothesis of rational expectation loses of 
significance and this for all the markets. 
After classification of the analysis by periods of stability and volatility, results in-
dicate that beliefs and animal spirits drive the economies whatever the period is of 
stability or of high volatility. 
Results cannot serve, however, to conclude what factor affects the variety of trading 
across the periods of high volatility opposite to that during the periods of stability. 
They allow, however, to understand only what factors can explain how the economy 
works. Financial markets trade in non-rational way. Investors’ belief and their be-
havioral bias conduct their decision-making process and induce therefore a cumula-
tive dysfunction on financial markets taking the form of repeated cycles.
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